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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DENNIS SESSIONS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 920553-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for two counts of
forgery, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-501 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Is the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's
finding of guilt?
"When challenging the findings of fact of the trial
court on appeal, the appellant must show that the findings of
fact were clearly erroneous."
475 (Utah 1990).

State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474,

"In order to show clear error, the appellant

must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence,
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the findings against an attack."
475-76.

Id. at

This Court will reverse the trial court's finding of

guilt only if it is "against the clear weight of the evidence,"
or if the Court "otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made . . . "
191, 193 (Utah 1987).

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d

Where, as here, defendant has failed to

"marshal" the evidence in support of the trial court's findings,
this Court may properly decline to consider his argument.
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah
1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with burglary, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1) (1990);
theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-404 (1990); and two counts of forgery as second degree
felonies, in violation of Utaih Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (b) &
(3) (b) (1990) (R. 9-13) .
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted as
charged on the forgery counts. The remaining charges were
dismissed due to insufficient evidence (Transcript of Bench
Trial, 2 July 1992, [T.] at 129; R. 26).
The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent
terms of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 3435).

See also Second Amended Commitment to Utah State Prison,
2

filed September 16, 1993, which has not been numbered in the
record.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Burglary and Theft
Kathleen Cline's wallet was stolen from her Bountiful,
Utah home on April 24, 1992 (T. 14-19, 128). Among the items in
Mrs. Cline's wallet were $400 in cash and a checkbook containing
fifteen to twenty blank checks (T. 19). Mrs. Cline discovered
the theft of her wallet around noon and immediately closed her
account at First Security Bank (FSB) in Bountiful (T. 20-21).
Forgeries
At 4:49 p.m. that same day, defendant cashed a check
for $156 made out to him on Mrs. Cline's account at a Salt Lake
City branch of FSB (T. 50; State's Exhibit #1).

The memo line

alleged the check was for "car repairs" (State's Exhibit #1).
Dawn Arambula, the drive-up bank teller who cashed the check,
first obtained identification from defendant and wrote his
driver's license number on the back of the check (T. 48-50, 70;
State's Exhibits ##1, 5).
At 5:11 p.m., defendant cashed another check for $156
made out to him on Mrs. Cline's account at another Salt Lake City
branch of FSB (T. 52-57; State's Exhibit #2).

As before, the

memo line alleged the check was for "car repairs" (State's
Exhibit #2).

David Passey, the drive-up bank teller who cashed

the second check, also obtained identification from defendant and

3

similarly wrote his driver's license number on the back of the
check (T. 52-55, 70; State's Exhibits ##2, 5).
Defendant attempted to cash a third check made out to
him on Mrs. Cline's account at yet another Salt Lake City branch
of FSB; however, the bank teller, apparently noting there was a
"flag on the account[,] . . . confiscated" the check and
defendant's driver's license (T. 69).
Mrs. Cline was the sole holder/signatory of the FSB
checking account and was not acquainted with defendant, nor had
she authorized him or anyone else to write the checks on her
account (T. 23).
Police Investigation
Officer Kilpack of the Bountiful City Police Department
investigated the forgeries and arrested defendant and at least
one other suspect, Edward Evans, for their alleged involvement in
both the burglary/theft of Mrs. Cline's wallet and the subsequent
forgeries (T. 58-66)-1

Defendant waived his right to remain

silent2 and was interviewed by Officer Kilpack during transport
to the Davis County Jail (T. 63-65).

Defendant admitted passing

the checks using his own identification; however, he denied any
involvement in the burglary/theft (T. 66). Rather, defendant

1

Evans initially implicated defendant in the
burglary/theft of the wallet; however, at trial, Evans claimed he
had lied about defendant's involvement and that defendant did not
participate in the burglary/theft (T. 85). Although Evans
admitted stealing the wallet, he denied any involvement in the
subsequent forgeries (T. 84).
2

See Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4

alleged that he was approached by Evans and an unidentified
woman3 while at a 7-11 store near his home (T. 66-68) .
According to defendant, Evans and the woman asked him to pass the
checks because neither one of them had identification (T. 66).
Defendant told the officer that the woman wrote out the checks
and signed them "Kathleen Cline" (T. 116). Defendant said the
checks were written out for $156 because "they needed
approximately $300 to purchase cocaine and they also needed some
gas money" (T. 68). Defendant admitted that he had a "pretty
good idea" that the woman who signed the checks was not Kathleen
Cline (T. 67, 117) .
Trial Strategy
At trial, defendant claimed he did not suspect the
checks were stolen until after the third bank teller confiscated
his license (T. 120). Specifically, defendant alleged that
Evans, whom he had known since childhood, offered him a ride home
from the 7-11 store (T. 100). Evans introduced the woman with
him as "Kathy" and told defendant that she had just left her
husband (T. 101). Evans then asked defendant if he would be
willing to cash one of the woman's checks so that they could "go
party," as neither he (Evans) nor the woman had any
identification (T. 102). The woman explained that she had no
identification because she had fought with her husband and had
left with nothing but her checkbook (T. 102).
3

Officer Kilpack had the impression that defendant
really knew the woman, but never specifically identified her (T.
67) .
5

Additionally, defendant claimed that after he cashed
the first check, the woman showed him a deposit entry in the
check register for $1,000 and asked if he wanted to cash a
"couple of more checks" (T. 103). Defendant said, "Sure" and
they "drove to another bank in Sugarhouse and cashed another
check and from there it seems [sic] like we were on a roll" (T.
103).

However, when the third bank confiscated his license,

defendant claimed he became "very suspicious" that "[t]here was
something a little more to it than what they had told [him]" (T.
104).

Defendant said he asked the woman about the checking

account and that she "stuck with the same story and said she had
broken up with her husband and that it was her checking account"
(T. 104). Defendant told the woman to drive off, and that he
would get his driver's license later (T. 104).
Guilt Determination
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found
defendant guilty of two counts of forgery.

Specifically, the

court found there was "no question" defendant knew the checks
were stolen, "or had a good idea that they were stolen or at
least did not belong to the person who was filling them out" (R.
129-30, the court's oral ruling is reproduced in Addendum A ) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should not consider defendant's challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence to support his theft conviction
because defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence
supporting the trial court's determination of guilt on the
6

charges of forgery.

Even if the Court were to consider the

merits of defendant's claim, there was ample evidence before the
trial court to sustain its determination of defendant's guilt.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TOGETHER WITH
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF
GUILT
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to
support his convictions for forgery.

Br. of App. at 6-7.

This

Court should reject defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence based on his failure to comply with the marshaling
requirements of State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1990)
and State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734-35 (Utah App.), cert,
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991).
When challenging the findings of a trial court, it is
the defendant's burden to marshal all of the evidence in support
of the trial court's guilt determination and then demonstrate
that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the trial court's finding
against the asserted challenge.
Drobel, 815 P.2d at 734.

Moosman. 794 P.2d at 476;

In considering a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's
findings, the reviewing court applies a clearly erroneous
standard.

Moosman, 794 P.2d at 475. Accordingly, the trial

court's finding of guilt will be reversed only if it is "against
the clear weight of the evidence," or if the Court "otherwise

7

reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made . . ."

State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).

Defendant has failed to meet this purposefully heavy
burden.

Rather, than marshaling all the supporting evidence and

then demonstrating that the court's verdict is against the clear
weight of the evidence, or that the court's verdict is definitely
and firmly mistaken, defendant has blended the evidence
supporting the verdict with that which he believes conflicts with
the verdict.

In essence, defendant merely reargues the relative

merits of the testimony presented below.

However, this Court

does not sit as the trier of fact, and defendant's attempt to
reargue the evidence presented at trial is therefore not a proper
method for challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Rather,
[i]n order to properly discharge the duty of
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must
present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports
the very
findings the appellant resists. After
constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenger must
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The
gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to
convince the appellate court that the court's
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly
erroneous.
West Vallev Citv v. Majestic, 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App.
1991).

Because defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence

supporting the trial court's verdict, this Court should refuse to
consider his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Even if the Court were to consider defendant's
sufficiency challenge, there was ample evidence to support
8

defendant's conviction.

Rather than recount the evidence

supporting defendant's conviction, the State refers the Court to
the Statement of the Facts at pp. 3-6, supra. Viewed in its
proper light on appeal, the evidence presented at trial provides
substantial support for the trial court's finding that defendant
knowingly forged the checks on Mrs. Cline's account (R. 129-30),
see Addendum A.

This court should therefore reject defendant's

sufficiency challenge.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, defendant's forgery
convictions should be affinned.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l(o * day of November, 1993
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

HAN DECKEI
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
WILLIAM J. ALBRIGHT, attorney for appellant, 74 East 500 South,
#245, Bountiful, Utah

84010, this IG

day of November, 1993.
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ADDENDUM A

checks were there, it would seem inconceivable to me, your
Honor, that a person who was acting with that state of mind,
who was innocent so to speak, wouldn't be aware rather early
on that this was a crime that was being perpetrated and that
he was part of the perpetration of that crime.
I would submit, your Honor, that the State has
borne its burden and that the defendant should be found
guilty of all four counts as charged.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

The Court will rule as follows in the matter:
First as to the facts that the Court would find, the Court
would find that there is no question on April 24th, 1992
someone went into Mrs. Cline's home in Bountiful and took her
wallet that had a certain amount of cash and some blank
checks in it.

The evidence indicates that the vehicle used

was one which belonged to a third person who is not charged,
and the evidence shows that that vehicle was seen at the
location in question and that there were three individuals in
that vehicle.
room door —

Mrs. Cline testified that she heard the family
or the door open only once.

Mr. Evans's

testimony is that he opened the door, saw the purse and then
went back and told others and that Mr. Sessions, who was in
the car, came and took the purse.

Mrs. 01 sen across the

street testified that she saw only one person go up to the
door, that that person was a person with light blonde hair

128

1

and when she described the individual to Mrs. Cline, she

2

indicated that she thought it would be Mr. Evans.

3

The Court would find that the State has failed to

4

meet its burden as to this defendant relative to the burglary

5

or the theft.

6

the afternoon of that same day, that Mr. Evans and his female

7

companion met the defendant, Mr. Sessions.

8

that at that time they requested him to cash certain checks

9

for them.

However, the Court would find that on or about

The Court finds

It's obvious from the checks that this is not a

10

joint checking account such as a husband and wife would have

11

and which would have any relevancy to any kind of a divorce.

12

It's obvious from that.

13

was no —

14

The Court further finds that there

that the purported owner had no idea.
The evidence showed that they went to several

15

banks.

16

$156.

17

testimony they were on a roll at that point and decided to

18

try again.

19

away, and again were able to cash another check in the amount

20

of $156.

21

at that time the matter was flagged and Mr. Sessions

22

excuse me, his ID was taken.

23

The first one they went to they wrote out a check for
They obtained that amount and in Mr. Sessions' own

They did, some 20 minutes later and a few blocks

The Court would find they tried a third time, but
—

The Court would find that there is no question in

24

the Court's mind that Mr. Sessions knew that these checks

25

were stolen or had a good idea that they were stolen or at

129

1

least did not belong to the person who was filling them out,

2

that he passed the checks is uncontradicted, that he obtained

3

the money for them is also uncontradicted.

4

therefore finds that the State has met its burden as to Count

5

2, or excuse me, Count 3 and Count 4 of forgery, which are

6

second degree felonies.

The Court

71

Mr. Sessions, would you please stand.

8

would inform you that you have a right to be sentenced in not

9

less than two, no more than 30 days or you may waive that

10

right and ask for presentence report.

11

that regard?

12

MR. MURPHY:

The Court

What is your desire in

Your Honor, I spoke with Mr.

13

Sessions, I've spoke with him about the desirability of

14

obtaining a presentence report and the fact that obtaining a

15

presentence report it would aid the Court in its decision

16

making process and that without a presentence report there is

17

a likelihood that the defendant will be incarcerated and

18

probably the point of incarceration would be the Point of the

19

Mountain.

20

to get it over with and to be sentenced today.

21
22

Nonetheless, however, it is Mr. Sessions' desire

THE COURT:

Is that what you would like to do,

Mr. Sessions?

23

MR. SESSIONS:

24

THE COURT:

Yes, it is.

Do you have a prior record, Mr.

251 Sessions?
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